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CHAPTER 9 
Integrating Evidence on the 
Determinants of Productivity^ 
Eric J. Bartelsman* and Henri L.E de Groot 
Abstract 
There is mounting theoretical and empirical evidence on determinants of productivity 
growth. However, the empirical findings provide policy makers with limited guidance 
to determine which of the correlates truly matter in determining growth rates and 
productivity levels. This paper reviews and characterizes the different empirical 
approaches that exist to date and proposes an analytical scheme that helps to study 
productivity growth in a more integrated framework. Within this framework, existing 
results from the empirical literature can be evaluated and new directions for future 
work can be identified. 
Keywords: productivity, convergence, productivity determinants, cross-country 
empirics 
JEL classifications: D24,033,047 
/ . Introduction 
The cumulative body of knowledge concerning productivity growth and its deter-
minants is vast. From a theoretical perspective, investment in the search for new 
knowledge is seen as a key determinant of productivity. However, the theories vary 
over how the allocation of such investment is determined, and how or how much such 
investment affects productivity levels or growth rates. The empirical evidence provides 
a quantification of the contribution of production factors to growth. In addition, there 
is evidence on the correlation between growth and a large collection of variables. 
* We are grateful to Stephan Raes for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
* Corresponding author. 
160 Eric J. Bartelsman and Henri LF.de Groot 
However, the various strands of the empirical literature have little in common and do 
not provide policy makers with much guidance on which of the many correlates truly 
matter in determining productivity levels and growth rates. 
In this chapter we will briefly review and characterise what is known about produc-
tivity growth, innovation and their determinants. The various strands of the traditional 
empirical literature will be discussed in light of various theories, and some recent empir-
ical results will be presented. Next, this chapter will place the various analytical schemes 
used to understand productivity growth in a more integrated framework that allows one 
to determine which factors are exogenous and which may be influenced through policy. 
Within this framework, results from the literature at the micro-, sectoral, or macro-levels 
can be evaluated, and new directions for empirical work can be identified. More spec-
ulatively, the chapter ends with an attempt to rank the quantitative importance of the 
various underlying determinants of productivity that can be influenced by policy. 
The bottom line of this chapter for policy makers is that the possibilities for improv-
ing productivity growth through better policy are not limited by historically achieved 
productivity gains at a national level, but by the trajectory of advances to be achieved in 
the future by the world's best. To place limits on rosy expectations of policy outcomes, 
this chapter will posit an international productivity frontier with a growth rate that 
has historic precedent. In the long run, it is quite unlikely that total factor productivity 
(TFP) in a small country can grow faster than the rate for the global frontier. At the same 
time, substantial and unexploited possibilities to catch up can exist that can be substan-
tially larger than those identified in macro-oriented research. This chapter will then 
disentangle the means by which firms in the economy can move towards the frontier. 
2. Theoretical evidence on productivity 
The branches of the theoretical literature each have their own method for making sense 
of empirical evidence on output, inputs, and growth. Models of economic growth that 
have been developed typically describe the process by which an economy saves and 
invests resources from current income in order to generate a stock that produces a 
flow of productive services in the future. In the traditional models (cf. Solow, 1956; 
Swan, 1956) growth is in the long-run exogenously limited. In contrast, endogenous 
growth models allow for a lasting influence of asset stocks on growth (e.g. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Intermediate positions are taken by 
the semi-endogenous growth models (cf. Jones, 1995). 
These growth models often underlie growth accounting exercises (see Section 3). 
With minor modifications, the standard empirical method for estimating the effect 
of R&D spending on growth can be used to retrieve estimates of the parameters of 
endogenous or semi-endogenous growth models. In this manner, the contribution of 
human capital formation, R&D activity, and capital accumulation to growth may be 
calculated (see, e.g. Jones and Williams, 1998). The growth literature also underlies 
empirical efforts at identifying the determinants and evolution of cross-country 
differences in growth and welfare (see Sections 4 and 5). The micro-based innovation 
models (see Reinganum, 1982, for an early example), are able to explain a host of 
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interesting factors influencing growth, such as the effects of entry barriers, or the 
supply of high-quality workers in local labour markets. Finally, the firm-demographics 
models can provide estimates of the contribution of firm-turnover and of within-firm 
growth to sectoral or aggregate growth (see, e.g. Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). 
3. Growth accounting 
Elsewhere in this volume, comparisons of total factor productivity (TFP) and labour 
productivity growth are made for recent periods and various countries, including the 
Netherlands. We refer to Chapter 2 for tables showing the contributions of capital, 
labour and TFP to output growth in the Netherlands. The theory underlying the growth 
accounting framework is rather simple. In an economy populated by a cost-minimizing 
representative firm, output is produced by employing the services of various productive 
inputs. A firm hiring factors of production will do so until the marginal cost of that 
factor equals the marginal revenue from selling output. In the accounting framework, 
all revenue is accounted for as payments for factor inputs. Under these conditions, the 
growth rate of output equals a weighted average of the growth rates of factor inputs 
plus the growth unaccounted for, or TFP. 
Growth accounting thus provides an historical analysis that attributes total output 
growth to various factors of production that are explicitly purchased. For cross-country 
comparisons, the method assumes that each country is populated by one representative 
firm that makes decisions regarding the level of productive inputs. As measurement 
becomes better, and the list of inputs broader through inclusion of R&D, other 
innovative activity, investment in 'intangibles', etc, the measured TFP growth will 
decline. Total factor productivity (TFP) thus remains the measure of our ignorance, 
that part of growth that is unaccounted for by explicit resource expenditures by firms. 
The good news is that growth accounting indeed accounts for most of output 
growth. For policy makers, the bad news is that it does not aid much in explaining, 
e.g. why investment in ICT is higher in the U.S. than in E.U. countries. 
4. Cross-country growth empirics: convergence 
A second class of empirical studies takes as a starting point the observed differences 
in growth rates over time and across countries. A seminal paper in the field is Baumol 
(1986) who showed the existence of a negative correlation between growth and initial 
income in a small cross-section of countries for a long time span. This result was seen 
as consistent with the neoclassical notion of convergence and evidence for a shrinking 
cross-sectional distribution of per capita income over time. This paper has provoked a 
wide range of studies assessing the existence of convergence (see Abreu et a/., 2003; 
Islam, 2003 for recent surveys). This literature has studied convergence at different 
levels of spatial aggregation (e.g. countries versus states; e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995), at different level of sectoral aggregation (e.g. Dollar and Wolff, 1993), for differ-
ent samples of countries and for different time-spans. The literature has also emphasised 
the important differences between what is known as p-convergence and ^ -convergence. 
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The former convergence concept looks for a negative relationship between per capita 
income or productivity and its subsequent growth rate whereas the latter concept looks 
for a declining cross-sectional dispersion of per capita income or productivity. 
The existing literature on the issue is by far too large and diffuse to properly 
characterise in this chapter. With the aim of this chapter in mind, though, a few 
important notions are worth mentioning. First, an assessment of productivity deter-
minants or developments requires the analysis of GDP per hour worked or total factor 
productivity, instead of the fairly widely used measure of GDP per capita. Second, 
analyses at detailed levels of sectoral aggregation are preferable over aggregate anal-
yses. At detailed levels of aggregation, production processes are less heterogeneous 
and productivity developments are more likely to capture real technological progress 
instead of changes in, for example, the production mix. Third, panel approaches 
are preferable (provided that sufficiently long time series of sectoral indicators are 
available) since those allow to: (i) control for variation over time; and (ii) allow for 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
Building on these notions, we will try to characterise the existing literature by an 
own empirical analysis on a sub-aggregate level in which we study the determinants 
of sectoral labour productivity growth.1 This analysis is in many respects exemplary 
for the huge body of empirical evidence that exists to date. For some reviews of the 
empirical literature, we refer to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Islam (2003), OECD 
(2003b) and Temple (1999). The analysis is performed for the Total Economy (TET), 
the aggregate sector Total Industry (TIN) as well as the sub-sectors agriculture (AGR), 
mining and quarrying (MID), manufacturing (MAN), services (SOC), electricity/gas 
and water (EGW), and construction (CST). 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. We first describe the evolution of labour- and 
total factor productivity over time across the OECD countries by showing the evolution 
of the cross-sectional distribution of productivity. As a second step, we perform 
an unconditional p-convergence analysis. In the final step, we aim at identifying 
determinants of productivity levels. 
This analysis extends the seminal analysis by Bernard and Jones (1996) in three 
directions. First, we consider a longer time span, namely 1960-1995. Second, we 
perform a pooled cross-section analysis of p-convergence (cross-sectional results 
are available upon request). Finally, we do not restrict attention to an analysis of 
unconditional P-convergence, but also perform a conditional p-convergence. 
4.1. Describing cross-sectional productivity developments: a-convergence 
Our first descriptive step in the analysis is to describe the evolution of the distribution of 
sectoral productivity growth in a cross-section of countries, better known in the litera-
ture as an analysis of ^ -convergence. Figures 9.1a-f contain the development over time 
of the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of labour productivity and total factor 
Similar results for total factor productivity are available upon request. 
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Figure 9.1. (a-h) Standard deviation of labour- and total factor productivity 
Mining and Uuarying 
1970 1972 1974 19761978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1970 
Manufacturing (C) 
0.25 
1975 1980 1985 
Electricity, Gas and Water 
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Table 9.1. Labour productivity -panel analysis 5-year intervals 1960-1995 
AGR MID MAN EGW CST SOC TET TIN 
Constant 0.1794 0.2384 0.1787 0.2293 0.3954 0.071 0.2917 0.2744 
4.04 2.24 3.63 4.07 6.10 1.46 8.30 8.2 
Log initial -0.0146 -0.0171 -0.0144 -0.0171 -0.0377 -0.0061 -0.0263 -0.0243 
productivity -3.12 -1.78 -2.98 -3.42 -5.94 -1.29 -7.68 -7.49 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.31 0.01 0.43 0.43 
Number of 77 64 76 76 76 71 77 73 
observations 
F-statistic 9.71 3.17 8.86 11.67 35.34 1.65 58.96 56.04 
Note: White /-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 
productivity taken over a cross-section of countries for the specified sectors. A declining 
standard deviation points at convergence of productivity levels and vice versa.2 
The results illustrate three important conclusions: 
• at the aggregate level (total economy and total industry) there is evidence for con-
vergence (viz. a declining standard deviation of the log of productivity); 
• convergence is by no means absolute; even for a fairly homogeneous set of OECD 
countries, substantial variation in cross-sectional variation persists; 
• at a more detailed sectoral level, with the exception of construction and electricity, 
gas and water, the evidence of convergence is very weak. 
These results are in line with other studies in the literature. Taking a more micro-
perspective at productivity developments, they also should not come as a big surprise. 
There are important and persistent differences across countries, sectors and industries 
that are expected to show up in productivity differences. Furthermore, relative positions 
in industries can quickly change, as a result of technological breakthroughs, entry, exit 
and relocation of firms. 
4.2. Unconditional ^-convergence 
A necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a-convergence is that the initial pro-
ductivity level and the subsequent growth rate of productivity are negatively correlated. 
This is known as p-convergence. Table 9.1 reveals the results of a panel regression 
analysis (cf. Islam, 1995) of the growth rate of labour productivity over the period 
1960-1995 for the sectors under consideration, using 5-year periods. These results 
reveal that with the exception of social services (and to a lesser extent mining and 
quarrying), there is statistically significant evidence of ^-convergence. Confronting 
this evidence with the lack of o*-convergence in, for example, the agricultural sector 
2
 Alternative (though less commonly used) measures for ^ -convergence exist and can give rise to different 
conclusions regarding convergence (see Dalgaard and Vastrup, 2001). 
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and manufacturing clearly reveals the relevance of countries changing relative positions 
(better known as regression towards the mean in the convergence literature). 
5. Cross-country growth empirics: finding productivity determinants 
Implicit in the previous analyses was the assumption that all countries converge to the 
same steady state. As already hinted at before, the empirical literature on convergence 
clearly reveals that this is an heroic assumption (e.g. Islam, 1995). As a first step, one 
can estimate the regression equations in Table 9.1 with fixed effects. Such an analysis 
indeed reveals that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity present. The problem 
with such an exercise, though, is that is provides no insights into the determinants of the 
country-specific steady states. The specification of the country-specific steady states is 
the issue to which we turn next. 
5.1. The growth accounting counterpart 
The last subsection concluded that there are important differences in the steady-state 
productivity levels to which countries converge. A most relevant question then, of 
course, is what determines those steady state differences. The early theoretical litera-
ture on this stayed close to the production function framework underlying the growth 
accounting literature. The cross-section growth empirical counterpart of this is the 
seminal work by Mankiw et al. (1992). They empirically test the neoclassical growth 
model. In a typical neoclassical growth regression, growth positively depends on the 
savings rate (resulting in physical capital accumulation) and negatively on employment 
growth (plus depreciation and exogenous technological progress). Extended versions of 
the model also allow a role for enrolment rates in education (resulting in human capital 
accumulation). At a detailed sectoral level, information on human capital is however 
not readily available. An empirical application of this framework to the previously 
described sample of sectors and countries can be found in Table 9.2. 
5.2. Barro regressions 
Expanding on the previous class of cross-country growth regressions, the literature has 
gone several steps further in trying to characterise the steady state of countries/sectors. 
Partly due to the open-ended character of endogenous growth theories that has -
bluntly stated - revealed that almost anything can matter in explaining growth and 
productivity differences, a plethora of proxies for 'anything that can matter' has 
been tried. The class of regression analyses using this approach is known as Barro 
regressions (after Barro, 1991). 
This literature has often been accused of testing without theorizing. Although this 
critique is to some extent valid, it also needs to be acknowledged that the theory provides 
little guidance on the correct specification of a model that can be tested empirically. 
Given the open-ended character of the theory, some new methodologies have been 
developed that can yield some guidance in determining the factors that are empirically 
found to be relevant. These methodologies have revealed that at a macro-level, variables 
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exist that can be argued to provide reasonably robust explanations for variations in 
growth rates (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Florax et al, 2002; Beugelsdijk et al.y 2004).3 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a complete description of all 
variables that have been analysed (see, for example, Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Temple, 
1999). The traditional growth enhancing factors that have extensively been analysed 
are innovation (e.g. Griliches, 1992; Jones and Williams, 1998), human capital (e.g. 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; King and Levine, 1994) and equipment capital (e.g. 
Temple, 1998). In the remainder of this section we turn more extensively to the less 
intensively studied factors such as the financial system, product market competition 
and labour market flexibility. 
5.2.1. Financial system 
Financial systems play a role in the growth process because they are important to the 
provision of funding for capital accumulation and for the diffusion of new technologies. 
The microeconomic rationale for financial systems is based largely on the existence 
of frictions in the trading system. In a world in which writing, issuing and enforcing 
contracts consume resources, and in which information is asymmetric and its acqui-
sition is costly, properly functioning financial systems can reduce these information-
and transaction costs. In the process, savers and investors are brought together more 
efficiently, and ultimately economic growth is affected. 
OECD (2001a) examines the role of financial systems in resource allocation 
and growth. It provides evidence suggesting that legal and regulatory framework 
conditions for financial systems, and particularly their enforcement and transparency, 
support innovation and investments in new enterprises. Evidence is also presented of 
significant correlations between financial development and productivity growth. 
5.2.2. Banking system and equity markets 
The financial system affects capital accumulation by altering the savings rate or by 
reallocating resources among different investments projects. It also serves in the 
monitoring of investments to reduce the risk that resources are mismanaged. The 
establishment of banks that can monitor investments for groups of investors reduces the 
duplication of monitoring costs. Besides reducing the costs of acquiring information 
ex ante, financial intermediaries may also mitigate the information acquisition and 
enforcement costs of monitoring firm managers and exerting corporate control ex 
post, after financing activity. 
3
 In the growth accounting method, with its emphasis on the role of factor prices, the relationship between 
productivity improvements and many of the institutionally related variables is less direct. It is thought that the 
'framework' conditions affect productivity and innovations by forcing managers to speed up the adoption 
of new technologies and by inducing firms to increase R&D investments in order to acquire a lead over 
their competitors. Flexibility of the labour market reduces the costs of adjusting resources in a case of 
technological success or failure. However, in the growth accounting method, with its assumptions of profit 
maximization by a representative firm, there is no role for such a mechanism. 
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Levine and Zervos (1998) investigate whether well-functioning stock markets and 
banks promote long-run economic growth. Well-functioning banks spur technological 
innovation by identifying and funding those entrepreneurs with the best chances of 
successfully implementing innovative products. The empirical results confirm the 
hypothesis that stock market liquidity and banking sector development both positively 
and robustly predict growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvements. 
Levine (1998) examines the relationship between the legal system and banking 
development and traces this connection through to long-run rates of per capita GDP 
growth, capital stock growth, and productivity growth. The evidence shows that the 
component of banking development associated with national legal characteristics is 
positively and robustly correlated with productivity growth. 
Raj an and Zingales (1998) examine whether financial development facilitates 
economic growth by reducing the costs of external financing to firms. They find that 
the sectors that are relatively more in the need of external financing develop faster in 
countries with better financial systems. 
5.2.3. Venture capital 
One important impediment to entry for new innovative firms is the lack of financing. 
Start-ups obviously have no track record, and often very little collateral, which makes 
it difficult for them to obtain bank loans or other forms of debt financing. The main 
source of financing for innovative start-ups is therefore equity capital, provided by 
venture capitalists. 
Kortum and Lerner (1998) investigate the influence of venture capital on patented 
inventions in the United States across 20 industries over three decades (1965-1992). 
The authors find that the amount of venture capital activity in an industry significantly 
increases its rate of patenting. The estimates suggest that venture capital accounts for 
about 15 per cent of industrial innovations. 
OECD (2001b) in one of the chapters discusses the importance of venture capital 
in financing new innovative firms. It also suggests that the degree of development 
of venture capital investment depends among other factors on the existence of 
well-functioning equity markets that facilitate sale of assets. These 'new' equity 
markets provide an exit mechanism that allows entrepreneurs and investors in early 
stage risky project to be compensated for their efforts. 
5.2.4. Product and labour market regulations 
Product market regulations affect productivity improvements and innovations by forc-
ing managers to speed up the adoption of new technologies and by inducing firms to 
increase R&D investments in order to acquire a lead over their competitors. 
OECD (2002) presents empirical evidence on the role that policy and institutional 
settings, in both product and labour markets, play for productivity and firm dynamics. 
It exploits firm-level data for ten OECD countries and industry level data for a broader 
set of countries, together with a set of indicators of regulation and institutional 
settings in product and labour markets. Industry productivity is negatively affected 
by strict product market regulations. Likewise, high hiring and firing costs seem to 
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hinder productivity. Moreover burdensome regulations on entrepreneurial activity as 
well as high costs of adjusting the workforce seem to negatively affect the entry of 
new small firms. 
OECD (2003a) looks at the scope and depth of regulatory reforms in OECD 
countries and tries to relate them to growth outcomes. The authors find evidence that 
reforms promoting private governance and competition tend to boost productivity. 
6. Evidence from convergence with productivity frontier 
In the empirical analysis in the three previous sections, we have used average produc-
tivity across firms to characterise the gap between initial productivity and the steady 
state productivity. Crucial in the analysis is the notion that countries converge to their 
own steady state. From a technology diffusion point of view, the approach that coun-
tries converge to their own steady states and that technology is a pure public good has 
several flaws. In an alternative view, technology gaps between a country and a leader 
country are driving technological change. And even more precisely, technology of the 
best performing firm in the leader country rather than average productivity matters 
for the potential for technology to diffuse. Taking a catching-up perspective on pro-
ductivity growth, our measure of average productivity and its distance to steady-state 
productivity has some evident flaws. 
In this section, we will describe some empirical evidence on technology gaps. 
In addition to average productivity gaps that are widely available (see, for example, 
Chapter 2), we will also show evidence on productivity at the frontier captured by 
the productivity of the top firms in an industry. In this subsection, we will proxy this 
by productivity of the top quartile of firms in a given sector. We restrict attention 
to a descriptive analysis, since the lack of information for many countries on the 
distribution of productivity across firms within an industry prevents a sensible 
regression analysis expanding on the analysis in Sections 4 and 5 at this stage. Still, the 
information is informative and provides some first view on more extensive information 
that will become available in the future and that - as we will argue in the sequel 
- will be important for understanding productivity differences and their evolution 
over time. 
Looking at average productivity in sectors, two key results stand out (cf. Chapter 2 
in this volume). First, sectoral leaderships are not restricted to the USA. Although 
the USA has the lead in many sectors, this is not true for all sectors (especially 
not if we control appropriately for differences in hours worked which are relatively 
high in the USA). Second, the productivity gap on average ranges from 0 to 
20 per cent. 
One step further, we can look at the ratio between productivity of the top-quartile in a 
sector and average productivity in that sector. The countries for which we have informa-
tion on the distribution of labour productivity within sectors are Finland (FIN), France 
(FRA), the United Kingdom (GBR), the Netherlands (NLD) and the USA (USA). The 
sectors covered are given in Table 9.3a. The results reveal that this ratio is relatively 
high in the USA with the top-quartile firms outperforming the average with a factor 
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Table 9.3a. Top-quartile labour productivity relative to average in 1992 
Top Quartile Relative to Average Productivity FIN FRA GBR NLD USA 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 2.35 1.88 2.24 1.96 2.47 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 1.84 1.92 1.82 1.74 2.54 
Wood and products 2.05 1.53 2.00 1.41 2.13 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 2.02 1.70 1.85 1.54 2.01 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 2.29 2.19 1.84 2.13 
Other non-metallic mineral products 2.18 1.69 1.96 1.83 2.07 
Basic metals 2.38 1.99 1.58 2.08 
Fabricated metal products 1.71 1.67 1.46 1.84 
Machinery and equipment 1.93 1.66 1.85 1.50 1.99 
Transport equipment 1.72 1.61 1.73 1.52 2.04 
Other manufacturing 1.77 1.64 1.83 1.59 1.91 
Unweighted average 2.02 1.70 1.92 1.63 2.11 
Unweighted average (balanced) 1.99 1.70 1.91 1.64 2.14 
1.8-2.5. The ratio is lowest in the Netherlands with the top-quartile outperforming 
the average with a factor 1.4-2.0. Finland and the United Kingdom are somewhere in 
between these two extremes whereas the situation in France strongly resembles that in 
the Netherlands. 
Combining the information on average (relative) productivity and top versus 
average productivity in a country provides evidence on: (i) the gap between the most 
productive firms in the countries under consideration; and (ii) the gap between average 
productivity in a country/sector and the top productivity in the world in that sector. It 
turns out that productivity in the top-quartile of firms in each sector is highest in the 
USA (details available upon request).4 Furthermore, we can determine the average 
productivity in a country relative to the technology frontier proxied by the productivity 
of the top quartile in the leader country of the world (viz. the USA). This information 
is contained in Table 9.3b. It is this gap that is in our view the most relevant empirical 
proxy for the potential of countries to catch up. It is evident that this gap is much larger 
than suggested on the basis of average productivity (of about 0-20 per cent). The 
average Dutch firms perform only at 40 per cent of their leading U.S. counterparts. 
Clearly a huge potential for catching up is still available. 
4
 Note that because of lack of data at a sectoral level we were unable to control for differences in hours 
worked. Macro-information on hours worked is available from the GGDC Total Economy Database 2003 
(University of Groningen and the Conference Board). Hours worked per worker are 1799,1676,1552,1653 
and 1397 for the USA, Finland, France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respectively. Using these 
to correct, for example, the unweighted average productivity, we find relative productivity levels of 0.33, 
0.48,0.34 and 0.50 for Finland, France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respectively. See also OECD 
(2003b), and de Groot et al. (2003), for similar exercises decomposing GDP per capita in differences in GDP 
per worker, participation and number of hours worked. 
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Table 9.3b. Average productivity relative to the top-quartile productivity in the 
USA 
Average Productivity Relative to Top Quartile USA FIN FRA GBR NLD USA 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.24 0.30 0.24 0.30 0.40 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.25 0.40 0.28 0.32 0.39 
Wood and products 0.40 0.42 0.13 0.39 0.47 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.50 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 0.26 0.39 0.26 0.47 0.47 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.38 0.60 0.32 0.45 0.48 
Basic metals 0.37 0.34 0.44 0.48 
Fabricated metal products 0.40 0.43 0.39 0.54 
Machinery and equipment 0.27 0.39 0.21 0.35 0.50 
Transport equipment 0.31 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.49 
Other manufacturing 0.31 0.38 0.65 0.44 0.52 
Unweighted average 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.39 0.47 
Unweighted average (balanced) 0.31 0.41 0.31 0.39 0.47 
7. Resource reallocation and aggregate productivity 
The heterogeneity in productivity across firms within an industry, as shown above, not 
only points to an increased potential for productivity improvements for the average 
firm. They also point to the importance of differences in firm size and changes in firm 
size for determination of aggregate productivity. Aggregate productivity growth is a 
weighted average of firm-level productivity, with appropriate adjustments for contri-
bution of firm entry and exit. If firms with higher than average productivity increase 
in size, this adds to aggregate productivity. Likewise, if less than average productivity 
firms shrink and/or exit the industry, aggregate productivity increases. The effect on 
the aggregate of productivity growth within a particular firm depends on the size of 
the firm. The aggregation rules can be used to decompose aggregate productivity 
growth into the contributions of with-firm growth, resource reallocation and firm 
entry and exit.5 
The OECD growth study (2003b) provides evidence on the decomposition of pro-
ductivity growth for the same countries for which the productivity distribution was 
displayed in Table 9.3b. Although exact results depend on the time period under re-
view, the industries selected, and the productivity measure considered, it is found that 
within-firm growth does not come close to explaining all productivity changes in the 
5
 Subtle differences in the decomposition may change the interpretation of the components as well as the 
numerical magnitudes. For example, the effect of entry depends on whether one considers entrants to 'replace' 
average incumbents, in which case the contribution of entry often is negative, or whether entrants replace 
'exiters', in which case the contribution usually turns out positive. Over longer periods, surviving entrants 
invariably provide a positive contribution to productivity, regardless of method of computation. 
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aggregate. In all cases, resource reallocation, either through changes in size of contin-
uing firms or through the exit and entry process, is seen to contribute substantially to 
aggregate growth. 
The decompositions provide an interesting view of how individual firms and the 
market-driven resource movements affect productivity. However, it is less clear how 
this process can be affected by underlying determinants. 
8. Integrating the evidence: a rough sketch for a model 
After this overview of scattered empirical and theoretical evidence on productivity 
determinants, it will be evident that a framework is needed that can integrate the dis-
parate empirical findings and the features of the underlying theoretical models. In 
recent papers, some of the aspects of the above-mentioned theoretical approaches have 
been combined. For example, Klette and Kortum (2002) integrate a firm demographics 
model with features of a macroeconomic growth model and Acemoglu et ah (2002) 
combine features of micro-based innovation models with firm demographics. In the 
present chapter, a plausible 'accounting' model is presented that combines all the fea-
tures. It is an accounting model, because not all the relevant features are endogenised 
and solved for in a general equilibrium setting. Instead, certain features are considered 
exogenous and the effects can be explored in alternate scenarios. 
The accounting framework used is in a sense ad-hoc, but fits with many of the 
features of current theoretical models and with stylised facts from recent empirical 
work. The framework hosts the following features: 
• Heterogeneity among firms in productivity and innovation strategies. 
• Resource reallocation between firms. 
• A global technology frontier. 
• Innovation and adoption of technology. 
• Global and local spillovers of knowledge. 
• Embodied and disembodied technology. 
The framework can be used to decompose productivity into contributions of primary 
factor inputs to output growth (growth accounting), but also to decompose overall 
productivity growth into the contribution of resource reallocation and within-firm 
productivity gains. Finally, the framework can be used to assess how changes in 
exogenous parameters affect the distance to the frontier and the speed at which the 
frontier is approached. 
8.1. Firm-level choices and market interactions 
While productivity levels and growth rates may be computed for countries and sectors 
of the economy, productivity is the result of micro-level decisions to convert inputs 
into output of goods and services. The basic unit of analysis of this framework will 
thus be a firm, although conceptually other units such as non-profit institutions, 
where decisions are made over inputs and outputs are covered as well. The firms in 
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an economy are heterogeneous in many dimensions: location, product mix, factor 
intensity, composition of workforce, size, productivity, and innovation strategy, to 
name a few. In the simple framework described below, firms may vary in size, 
productivity, and innovation strategy. 
The characteristic of firms most important for studying productivity growth is 
the strategy followed to improve their own productivity. Following notions that are 
common in economic literature, there are firms that continuously attempt to be near, 
or on, the technology frontier through innovative investments, while there are also 
firms that improve their productivity by purchasing, installing and learning to use 
technology embodied in capital goods.6 Finally, there are firms that operate at a 
distance from the frontier and employ perfectly known technologies. We label them, 
respectively, innovators, adopters, and followers. 
In the accounting framework, the innovators need to undertake innovative activities 
(conduct R&D, employ highly skilled workers, experiment with business practices) in 
order to increase the stock of knowledge that improves TFP in their own productive 
activities. The efficacy of the innovative activities is boosted through spillovers of 
their own knowledge stock, and from the stock available to firms at the frontier. 
The spillover parameter could be positive, as existing knowledge makes the work of 
researchers and innovators easier. Theoretically this 'standing on giants shoulders' 
effect could be outweighed by a negative 'depletion of technological opportunities' 
effect.7 The crucial aspect of innovation is that the profitability of the expenditure on 
innovative activity depends not only on technological success, but also on leveraging 
the fixed cost of the innovation through increases in scale of production. 
Adopter firms may employ some innovative activity to be able to use new tech-
nology embodied in capital goods. The firms purchase capital goods until expected 
costs and benefits are equal at the margin. The firms can improve TFP by adding 
'innovative effort' in the process of learning best how to use the technology embodied 
in the capital. By doing so, the firms are able to converge towards the technology 
frontier, or at least to the productivity level of the innovators. Because the increase in 
TFP is associated with the innovative use of technology embodied in the capital, the 
firms are not able to leverage the investment through increased size, to the extent that 
innovative firms can leverage fixed costs of increasing their knowledge stock. 
Finally, there are 'follower' firms that generate output and profit by employing 
labour and capital in well-known and well-understood production processes. These 
firms do not invest in uncertain innovative activities and have less variability in TFP 
and profitability than do innovators and adopters. TFP growth does take place, as 
knowledge diffuses, patents expire, education levels increase, etc. In the accounting 
model this is accomplished by assuming a diffusion duration that makes productivity 
growth a function of the level of the productivity gap between followers and adopters. 
6
 Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Gerschenkron (1952), Acemoglu et al. (2002), to name a few. 
7
 See Romer (2001), Kortum (1997), Jones and Williams (1998). 
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The choice of innovation strategy is not the only behaviour attributed to firms 
in the framework. Firms have the choice to exit the market altogether, and potential 
entrants may decide to enter the market. Further, the firms have the choice, given the 
demand curve they face, of the level of resources to apply to production. 
The demand curve facing a firm depends not only on the price-quality charac-
teristics of its products, which reflects the firm's productivity, but also on the supply 
conditions at other firms in the market. A successful innovator will potentially be able 
to supply a larger share of the market if it is able to mobilise productive resources 
rapidly. Innovators that are not successful in generating a good technological outcome 
quickly shrink, and/or exit the market. Adopter firms have much smaller swings in 
technological success or failure, much smaller variation in productivity, and thus have 
smaller potential shifts in market shares. 
A full general equilibrium model could show the conditions under which firms or 
potential entrants would decide to follow one of the strategies. Also, a model could 
show how, dependant on technological outcomes, resources in the economy would be 
added to or shifted away from firms, with firm exit at the extreme. Also, the decisions of 
firms on how much to spend on innovative activity and how much on capital and other 
primary inputs, would be determined by cost and benefit at the margin, taking into 
account actions of other firms and exogenous conditions. Such a general equilibrium 
model is complex, because firms must take into account not only the dynamics effects 
of their own actions but also how their actions affect their competitors, etc. Even 
simple versions of such models quickly run into computational bounds.8 Such a 
model does not exist at present, but the relevant behavioural descriptions of the firms' 
choices, as described above, will provide guidance in tracking the mechanism driving 
the effects of various determinants of productivity. 
With the simple breakdown of firms by innovation strategy, and a description of 
how firms' decisions interact with the demand side to determine resource allocation, a 
description will be given of the paths through which the various factors affect growth. 
These factors include traditional growth accounting items, but also factors such as the 
quality of the banking system, land use regulations, etc. It should be emphasised that 
the ultimate source of productivity growth is innovative activity, but that in a world 
with heterogeneous firms, aggregate productivity may change owing to movements 
of firms towards the frontier, and shifts in resources between firms. Further, the 
resource reallocation may itself affect firm-level decisions with regard to innovative 
activity. 
8.2. Qualitative effects of productivity determinants 
In presenting the qualitative effects of underlying drivers of productivity, their role in 
determining the choice by firms of their innovation strategy is first presented. Next, the 
firms' expenditures on factor inputs and innovative activities are linked to the under-
See Pakes and McGuire (2001) or Peeters (2002). 
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lying drivers. With these links in place, a method for quantification of the contribution 
of the various drivers to (potential) growth is given. 
8.3. Choice of innovation strategy 
Table 9.4 marks the factors affecting the choice of a firm at the margin between 
being and innovator or an adopter, and the choice at the margin between being an 
adopter or follower. The choice depends on the expected value of profits for firms 
engaging in each strategy. At the margin the innovators are more profitable if the cost 
of innovation is lower, if the chance of being technologically successful is higher, and 
if it is easier to leverage technological success with increased size. The latter depends 
on ease of resource reallocation and the speed with which customers can switch 
between suppliers. 
The costs of innovation will depend on the price of human capital and the efficacy 
with which it is used. The price will decrease with increased supply of skilled 
researchers, all else being equal. The efficacy of the human capital input depends 
on spillovers from past knowledge. The spillovers may vary according to whether 
the knowledge was developed in-house, by partners in networks, or in firms in value 
chain, or with public funding. The cost of attracting funds for such risky activities is 
reduced with the availability of venture capital. 
The chance of technological success rises with the research efforts expended 
by a firm. Per unit of own innovative input, the chance of success and the relative 
improvement in TFP, if the innovative activity is successful, depends on the available 
knowledge stock and spillovers, as well as on the quality of the researchers and their 
effort. For innovators, the size of the improvement resulting from research success 
Table 9.4. The choice of innovation strategy 
Adopters vs. Innovators Followers vs. Adopters 
The cost of innovative activity 
Private and public R&D X X 
Human capital X X 
Foreign R&D spillovers X 
Venture capital X 
Chance of technological success 
Private and public R&D X 
Human capital X 
Foreign R&D spillovers X 
Resource reallocation 
Cost of adjusting resources with technological success/failure 
Labour-market Flexibility X 
Banking system X X 
Equity markets X X 
Sensitivity of customers to price/quality 
Product-market regulations X 
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is high, but the chance of achieving the breakthrough is rather small. For adopters 
applying innovative activity to make use of technology embodied in capital, the risks 
are smaller, as is the size of the resulting productivity improvement. 
Finally, the choice between being an innovator or adopter depends on the speed 
with which a technologically successful firm can spread the fixed costs of innovation 
over higher production volume. This depends, in turn, on the speed with which 
the firm can mobilise resources (capital and labour, and new production locations), 
and on the sensitivity of customers to differences in price-quality characteristics 
among competing suppliers. Resource reallocation becomes less costly with increases 
in flexibility of employment protection legislation (EPL). On the other hand, if it 
becomes difficult to hire and fire workers, firms more readily choose to engage in 
'smooth' upgrading of technology rather than to risk a disruptive change. Furthermore, 
firms have more reason to train workers in-house because the expected period over 
which the costs are amortised gets stronger. Strong EPL thus shifts the balance from 
innovator to adopter. Resource reallocation also is aided by a well functioning banking 
system and the possibility to finance changes in corporate ownership. 
The choice between being an adopter of technology and a follower also depends on 
the costs of innovation and resource reallocation. For adopters, productivity advances 
are achieved by adding complementary human capital, in order to learn how to employ 
the purchased technology. The outcomes of this innovative effort are not very uncertain. 
Nonetheless, most of the learning costs will need to be made again if the firm attempts 
to increase its size because the innovation is not non-rival in production to the same ex-
tent as it is for innovators. For this reason, reallocation of resources is not as important. 
A good banking system is important in order to provide the resources to purchase the 
capital with embodied technology, and proper incentives (e.g. corporate governance) 
need to be in place to improve the efficiency of the complementary innovative activities. 
8.4. Within-firm innovative activity, capital accumulation and growth 
In growth accounting, which is an appropriate analytical tool at the firm level, output 
growth can be decomposed into the contribution of capital deepening, innovative cap-
ital and innovation. A remaining residual describes the growth arriving as manna from 
heaven. In growth accounting, contributions can be calculated only for those factors 
where input decisions are made by the 'decision-making unit' under study. The con-
tribution of capital deepening comes through a firms' purchases of capital goods, the 
innovative capital contribution depends on the quality of the purchased capital (e.g. 
ICT capital) and the innovative expenditures needed to learn how to use it well, while 
the contribution of innovation is often proxied by weighting the growth of the avail-
able knowledge stock with the expenditure share on own-R&D. Many of the possible 
determinants of aggregate productivity are external to the firm but affect the firm's deci-
sions, and thereby within-firm productivity growth. These links are marked in Table 9.5, 
showing when a determinant affects the contributing factor to within-firm growth. 
The columns of Table 9.5 are related to the innovation strategies chosen by a firm, 
as displayed in Table 9.4. The residual accrues to the followers and its magnitude 
is related to the size of the TFP gap from the followers to the adopting firms. For 
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Table 9.5. Factors underlying within-firm output growth 
TFP Growth 
Residual Innovative 
Activity 
K/L + 
Innovation 
Capital Deepening 
(K/L) 
Own inputs 
R&D X 
ICT capital X X 
Non-ICT capital 
Skilled workers X X 
External determinants 
Innovation 
Public R&D X X 
Foreign R&D spillovers X X 
Firm co-operation and knowledge X 
flows in clusters 
Embodied technology flows (i.e. X 
ICT) 
Human capital 
Participation X X 
Skill upgrading X X 
Financial system 
Venture capital X 
Equity markets X 
Banking system X 
Corporate governance X X 
Product market competition 
Property rights X 
Ease of entry X 
Regulation in markets for goods X 
and services 
Labour market flexibility 
Labour market regulation (firing X 
and hiring) 
Wage bargaining system X 
Property market 
Town and planning regulation 
followers, TFP growth thus comes about as knowledge about production processes 
and products becomes fully diffused.9 Innovators actively build a knowledge stock and 
continue to invest in innovative activity in an attempt to stay at or near the productivity 
frontier. Adopters and innovators actively make use of existing technology by 
9
 It is assumed that policy has no direct influence on the rate of catch-up or on the number of years of lag 
to the frontier for follower firms. Of course, policy will affect the choice of a firm's innovation strategy, and 
thus the number of followers. 
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purchasing capital and applying it in an innovative manner. This innovative capital 
deepening may increase TFP, as complementary innovative inputs help close the gap 
to more productive firms. All three types of firms may increase labour productivity 
through traditional capital deepening. 
The marks in the rows of Table 9.5 show how the factors underlying within-firm 
output growth contribute to the growth accounting components, such as innovative 
activity. The first set of rows are the 'own inputs' under direct control by the firm. ICT 
capital is taken to be an innovative input. This relates to the possibilities to use ICT to 
innovate in business processes and other methods for transacting with customers and 
suppliers. Of course, ICT capital may also just be used as a traditional machine, with 
little or no 'knowledge' component. 
The second set of rows are determinants external to the firm, and possibly related 
to policy instruments. For example, a mark in the column 'innovative activity' for the 
row showing public R&D, means that a higher stock of public R&D knowledge will 
increase expenditures on innovative activity for innovative firms. For the firm, the 
costs and benefits of an extra unit of innovative input need to be weighed at the margin. 
This is affected by costs of innovative inputs, effectiveness of activity, spillovers, 
chance of technological success and magnitude of improvement if successful, and 
the leverage applied to the outcome through resource reallocation. Some of the 
determinants operate through lowering the costs of innovative activity, e.g. a higher 
supply of skilled workers. Other determinants affect innovative activity indirectly, 
through the increased potential profitability of a successful innovation brought about 
by increased resource reallocation, e.g. property rights, or strong competition policy. 
For innovators and adopters, the amount of exploration and learning applied 
together with new capital, determines the amount of productive advance a firm makes, 
beyond that embodied in the equipment. The underlying factors that matter here are the 
costs and availability of human capital. Further, financing must be available for the not 
so risky innovation and for the capital deepening itself. Good corporate governance 
plays a role in driving managers to put in the effort to add innovative value to 
the purchased capital. 
Most of the determinants in the table operate in a manner similar to that described 
for Table 9.4. A well functioning venture capital system allows firms to undertake 
risky innovative projects. Some underlying factors require further explanation. For 
example, the wage bargaining system may affect growth through a few channels. 
At the most elementary level, market power of unions may increase the wage rental 
ratio and result in an inefficiently high capital-labour ratio. Under the assumption 
that technology is embodied in capital, output per hour will increase through this 
channel. Further, the market power of unions may result in firms attempting to close 
out labour through innovating with a bias against labour (Caballero and Hammour, 
1998). Alternatively, it has been argued that bargaining between workers and firms, 
with government involvement, may lead to paths with low wage growth. This in turn 
reduces capital investment and increases the age of the capital stock, which results in 
low productivity growth. Some evidence for the Netherlands (Bartelsman, 2000) points 
out that such wage moderation actually serves as a means to reduce opportunistic 
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behaviour of unions following innovation and capital investment. This mitigates the 
hold-up problem that would have reduced innovative activities and investment. 
9. Quantification of the underlying determinants of growth 
Neither traditional growth accounting, nor the cross-country growth regressions, 
provide much guidance in calculating how a change in, for example, property rights, 
will affect growth. With growth accounting, by construction, labour productivity 
growth equals the contribution of capital deepening plus the contribution of knowledge 
intensity growth plus the residual. All external factors 'compete' to contribute to 
the residual. 
The empirical evidence on the role of various institutional settings, such as the 
regulatory environment or the quality of the banking system, usually depends on 
quantifying the institutional setting in an index, and regressing growth in a panel 
of countries, sectors, and/or time on the index. This evidence does not capture 
the path or mechanism through which the institutional setting affects growth. The 
regressions reflect a reduced form of a more complete model. The parameter estimated 
in such standard regression specifications coincides with a partial derivative of 
aggregate output growth with respect to the underlying factor, all else being equal. 
Because the 'all else' factors also vary by country and over time, the parameter 
estimated cannot be translated directly into appropriate unknown model parameters. 
In cross-country regressions, it is very difficult to assess the relative importance of the 
determinants, and no allowance is made for the indirect effect of the determinant on 
own inputs. 
An important advantage of the model sketched out in this chapter is that one can 
generate growth scenarios for different values of, for example, the availability of 
venture capital, and then conduct growth accounting for each scenario. Under the dif-
ferent scenarios, output growth will vary, as will the contribution of capital deepening, 
innovative activity, and the residual. Further, the different scenarios will also provide 
different decompositions of aggregate productivity into the contributions of within-firm 
growth and resource reallocation. The magnitudes of the effect of various determinants 
could be based on model calibration, using known moments in the sectoral country 
time series on outputs and inputs as well as the regression parameters from the 
empirical literature. In other words, one would search over the parameter space of 
the model such that the parameters estimated from data generated by the model match 
the empirical results from the literature. Because such a calibration exercise effort has 
not been made yet, no exact quantifications can be made. Instead, a verbal example will 
be provided of how a policy change will affect the outcomes of the model paths of output 
and productivity. 
Let us consider the example of a reduction of hiring and firing costs brought about 
through appropriate changes in policy. The long-run growth rate of the innovators does 
not change, even with changes in the allocation of research activity, and remains equal to 
the growth rate of the global frontier. What does change, is the share of firms choosing to 
be innovators, because lower resource adjustment costs improves the ability to exploit 
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opportunities if the innovation is successful and reduces costs of shrinking the firm when 
the innovation fails. In the short run, productivity growth will be boosted as more firms 
move closer to the global frontier and as resources can shift more rapidly to firms that 
have higher productivity. In the long run, average productivity levels will be higher, and 
more firms will be closer to the global frontier than before the policy change. Further, 
aggregate productivity will be higher for firms grouped by innovation strategy because 
the better firms are able to gain greater output shares. The contribution to growth from 
resource reallocation, both through entry and exit and between existing firms, increases. 
Within-firm growth may actually decline in the long run, because the catch-up effect is 
reduced with more firms being closer to the frontier, on balance. On balance, the policy 
change has only transitory productivity growth effects, but provides a long-run path of 
output that is produced closer to the global productivity frontier, providing permanent 
welfare gains. 
10. Conclusion 
The determinants of productivity differences and the evolution of productivity over 
time has in the past decades been intensively studied in both the theoretical as well 
as the empirical literature. This literature has provided a plethora of theoretical and 
empirical approaches. An overall integrating framework is lacking. In this chapter, 
we have identified: (i) heterogeneity of firms within sectors; (ii) entry and exit of 
firms; (iii) the institutional context within which firms operate; (iv) the concept of a 
world technology frontier; (v) local within and between sector knowledge spillovers 
and global spillovers; (vi) embodied versus disembodied technology; and (vii) 
innovation as opposed to adoption as key elements in both the theoretical as well 
as the empirical literature that should be part of an integrating framework. A first 
attempt to develop such a framework was presented, with an emphasis on qualitative 
aspects. Future work will be devoted to refining and especially calibrating the 
framework. 
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Appendix: Data 
Our main data source is the International Sectoral Data Base from the OECD (version 
1998). This database contains information on GDP in constant dollars, the investment 
ratio, the number of employees, a simple construct of total factor productivity (as 
an index),10 capital stocks, etc. Data on productivity of the average firm and the top 
quantile of firms were compiled by the OECD firm-level study (Bartelsman and Barnes, 
2001; Bartelsman et ah, 2003; OECD, 2003b). Details are available upon request from 
the authors. 
10
 To obtain Total Factor Productivity in comparable levels, we computed Total Factor Productivity for 1990 
and used the index available in the International Sectoral Data Base to generate time series of Total Factor 
Productivity. 
